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The Effect of Risk Presentation on Product Valuation: An Experimental Analysis  
 
Abstract 
We examine how people might evaluate a product with novel attribute, given various 
kinds of risk information.  Using a product with healthful benefits, we assess subjects’ 
willingness to pay given various kinds of health risk information conveying reduced 
health risks, life tradeoffs, and ambiguity.  Four treatments in separate non-hypothetical 
experimental auctions are used to elicit willingness to pay values.  Results suggest that 
willingness to pay vary across the groups that receive differing risk information.  
Specifically, willingness to pay was higher for the group that was given clear risk 
information and questions related to life tradeoffs than for the group given ambiguous 
risk information.  Willingness to pay was lowest for the group that was given no risk 
information at all. 
 
KEY WORDS: experimental auctions, health benefits, novel attribute, product evaluation, 
risk reduction, and willingness to pay. 
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Introduction 
Firms often try to differentiate their products by introducing additional product 
features or attributes.  While one stream of general marketing research (e.g., Carpenter, 
Glazer, and Nakamoto 1994; Meyers-Levy and Tybout 1989; Nowlis and Simonson 
1996; Mukherjee and Hoyer 2001) has shown that adding familiar attributes to a product 
generally improves product evaluation and performance, another set of research indicates 
that adding familiar attributes may not always improve product evaluation (e.g., 
Broniarczyk and Gershoff 1997; Nowlis and Simonson 1996; Simonson, Carmon, and 
O’Curry 1994; Brown and Carpenter 2000).  Although these studies provide considerable 
information on the effects of familiar attributes, little is known about the effects of novel 
attributes. For food and other products, these attributes may include health risk reduction 
information.  To fill this void, we examine how individuals evaluate a product with a 
novel attribute when given differing risk information.  In particular, we assess what 
people might be willing to pay in an auction for a healthful product. The auction is 
conducted in an experimental setting and the product is a  cookie made with a healthful 
syrup. Subjects are given various kinds of health risk information conveying reduced 
risks of diabetes and colon cancer, risk tradeoffs, and ambiguity.  These types of health 
risks may be difficult to quantify, may largely depend on individual behavior, and are 
more difficult to communicate to people than other measures of risk (Kolata 2005; 
Ellsberg 1961).  
We elicit subjects’ willingness to pay (WTP) using four treatments in separate 
experimental groups.  We use a variety of approaches to provide risk information, 
including a treatment involving a combination of life-duration tradeoffs and probability   3
weighting functions (PWFs).  PWFs, especially nonlinear ones, relax some of the 
traditional axioms of the conventional expected utility (EU) framework (see Tversky and 
Khanemann, 1992; Quiggin, 1982).  PWFs for financial gambles have been examined 
before (see for example, Wakker and Deneffe, 1996), and in one study, mortality risks 
have been the sole focus (Bleichrodt and Pinto, 2000) but little effort has been made to tie 
PWFs to consumers’ WTP for products with health-related benefits.  This paper is a first 
step in this line of research. 
In one of our four treatments, we also introduced the concept of risk ambiguity.  
Many economists have acknowledged shortcomings of the EU framework, and several 
alternatives relax key restrictive assumptions that the EU framework imposes (see 
Starmer, 2000).  Explanations of ambiguity include conflicting information (Fox and 
Tversky, 1991): if experts themselves are not clear about the risk magnitudes, then it is 
difficult to imagine that the public will be.  Most theorists assume that individuals will be 
averse to ambiguity, but the degree of aversion remains an open empirical question.  In 
one study Eisenberger and Weber (1995) explore the relationship between ambiguity and 
values and find evidence that ambiguity aversion exists for a pool of experimental 
subjects.  They also find that ambiguity reduces a subject’s maximum willingness to pay 
for an ambiguous financial gamble.  Fox et al. (2002) also examines the effect of 
information on food choices and very recently, Kivi and Shogren (2005) look at 
ambiguity’s connection to food choice in a fashion similar to one of our treatments. 
Finally, other details about this experiment can be found in Shaw, Nayga and Silva 
(2006). 
1. Objective and Hypotheses   4
The specific objective of our study is to assess subjects’ willingness to pay for a 
new healthful product when presented with differing health risk information using non-
hypothetical experimental auctions.  The healthful product used in this study is a cookie 
made of syrup from a Yacon tuber grown in Peru.  Yacon has been found to have 
prebiotic properties and high fructooligosacarids content which helps in digestion, 
thereby reducing the risk of colon cancer and diabetes.  Exact health risk reductions have 
not been scientifically determined at this time, so this presents an important opportunity 
to examine choices with ambiguity present, and to explore whether subjects’ provision of 
life-tradeoffs or PWFs influence valuation.  Therefore, we hypothesize that: 
H1: Provision of risk information increases product valuation or WTP. 
H2: Product valuation or WTP will be higher for those given clear and extensive 
risk information vis-à-vis those given ambiguous risk information as suggested by Sarin 
and Weber (1993). 
 
2. Experimental Design 
  Marketing researchers, economists, and psychologists rely on measures of WTP 
in estimating demand for public and private goods, in valuation of product attributes, and 
in designing optimal price schedules (Wertenbrock and Skiera 2002).  To elicit our 
subjects’ WTP, we developed pencil and paper experiments after holding several focus 
groups and pretests.  Subjects for the experiments were undergraduate students at Texas 
A&M University.  Four studies or treatments were developed with varying presentations 
of the health risk information given to subjects. 
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2.1.  Experimental Auctions 
Although the use of experimental auctions has increased in recent years, 
applications related to product marketing, pricing, and adoption have generally been 
limited.  Most applications of experimental auctions can be found in the economics 
literature but these mostly involve tests of economic theory rather than using valuations 
to make marketing or product adoption decisions (Lusk, Feldkamp, and Schroeder 2004).  
A few studies have used experimental auctions in the marketing literature (e.g., Hoffman 
et al. 1993; Wertenbrock and Skiera 2002), but applications are still rare. 
To elicit the WTP values, we used a non-hypothetical 4
th price Vickrey auction 
(see Starmer and Sugden, 1991).  We consider our experimental method “non-
hypothetical” because we use real products and real money to provide the participants an 
incentive to reveal their true value for a product rather than respond in a hypothetical 
survey or traditional market research setting (e.g., Cummings, Harrison, and Rutstrom, 
1995; Fox et. al., 1998; List and Shogren, 1998).  So unlike methods based on stated 
preference data, Vickrey auctions provide bidders with an incentive to reveal their WTP 
truthfully because they must buy the good in a real transaction if their bid wins the 
auction.  Several studies (e.g., Wertenbrock and Skiera 2002) have questioned 
willingness to pay results obtained by traditional marketing surveys because what 
consumers say they will do and what they actually do given real world circumstances are 
often quite different.  Traditional survey methods are particularly problematic if 
respondents have vague or undefined incentives to seriously evaluate the food.  In 
contrast, experimental auctions provide participants with a well-defined incentive 
structure that enables the researchers to more accurately elicit the value of a “new   6
product”.  The following outlines the procedures for the 4th price auction used in our 
study. 
Step 1: Each subject was endowed with the control product: a regular homemade 
sugar cookie.  Subjects were informed of the representative price for this 
control product (reference price).  The subjects were informed that he or 
she is free to walk out of the session with this product if he or she does not 
want to participate in the session.  They were then asked to write down in 
a sheet of paper their WTP to exchange the control product with the 
homemade Yacon cookie after tasting both cookies.  The participants 
simultaneously submitted sealed bids.  Then each bid was ranked ordered 
from highest to lowest. 
Step 2: The auctions involved six rounds of bids so that subjects could incorporate 
market feedback into their valuations. Subjects were told that only one 
round would be randomly selected to be binding, to control for demand 
reduction or wealth effects, and that the winners would be the individuals 
with bids greater than the 4
th highest bid.  The three highest bidders would 
have to pay the price equal to the 4
th highest bid.  The advantage of using 
the 4
th price auction instead of the 2
nd price auction is that there will be 
potentially more winners per session.  The 2
nd price auction method will 
only produce one winner per session and this situation could disengage 
some of the participants, especially in sessions involving at least 30 
subjects.  Subjects were not told if they won until the winning round was 
randomly selected, but were told the 4
th highest bid on each round.   7
Step 3: The three winning bidders in the randomly selected round then exchanged 
their homemade sugar cookie with the homemade Yacon cookie and paid 
the 4
th highest bid.  All other subjects paid nothing and received no 




Each subject participated in one of the four treatments during a regularly 
scheduled class meeting. One class received one treatment and each student was 
compensated with $20 at the end. All subjects were asked identical questions about 
demographics and were asked to taste the two homemade cookies: the yacon cookie and 
sugar cookie.  
Treatment 1 subjects received no information about the health benefits of the 
Yacon cookie, other than it is a new product, being marketed.  No specific risk 
information was given to the subjects about this product.  All subjects in treatments 2-4 
viewed a risk ladder, a common visual device for risk communication (see Riddel and 
Shaw, 2006).  Treatment 2 subjects received “clear” risk information about the reductions 
in colon cancer and diabetes risks that a person could expect by adopting a diet that 
substituted Yacon for regular sugar syrup products.  These subjects were told that the 
chance of getting colon cancer for a non-smoker, after the age of 65 was 0.1% and for 
diabetes, this chance was 0.15%.  They were also told that smokers, those who ate many 
fatty foods, and those who did not exercise had a higher chance of getting colon cancer 
after age 65.  They were then informed that a regular diet of products made with the   8
Yacon syrup in place of conventional sweeteners would lead to a 0.01% reduction in 
colon cancer risk and a 0.05% reduction in diabetes risk after age 65. 
Treatment 3 subjects received the same information as subjects in treatment 2 but 
were additionally asked to provide information about life trade-offs, as well as, 
probability weights.  The iterative trade-off procedure originally developed by Wakker 
and Deneffe (1996), and applied to medical decisions by Bleichrodt and Pinto (2000) was 
followed.  In our procedure, however, each subject reveals the number of years of life 
that balance tradeoffs involving risks of diseases (colon cancer and diabetes).  These 
questions were asked to get subjects to think more about life trade-offs. 
Treatment 4 subjects received conflicting risk information in the form of a 
conflicting second “expert” opinion.  They were told that scientists do not know with 
certainty what health risk reductions would be associated with adopting the Yacon syrup 
diet.  They were presented with two assessments of risks by “two scientific experts”, each 
with differing opinions as to the risks.  The first group of scientists says the reduction in 
colon cancer and diabetes that people would receive is given as 0.1% after age 65.  The 
second group says that the risk reduction would in fact be 0.01% after age 65.  
 
3. Results 
The mean bids per round of the four treatments are exhibited in Figure 1.  It is 
clear that in five of the six rounds, the highest mean bid is for treatment 3.  The highest 
bid in round 6 is for treatment 4.  However, treatment 4’s subjects bid an average of only 
about $0.07 for the Yacon cookie across all rounds (see Table 1).  In the sixth round, one 
person in treatment 4 bid $3.00 for the cookie, driving up the mean bid in that round to   9
$0.20.  However, we note that this highest bidder in round six for treatment 4 has 
indicated that he has a relative that has been diagnosed with diabetes and was seated next 
to the second highest bidder.  We speculate that these two students shared information, as 
both of their previous five round action bids were very low, but we did not catch them 
talking to one another, so they were not dismissed and their bids must be considered valid 
without other evidence. Still, interestingly, if we drop this high bid, the average bid in 
round 6 for treatment 4 is only $0.016, far lower than average bids for treatment 2 ($0.05) 
and treatment 3 ($0.04).  It is, therefore, reasonable to conclude in light of this 
information that treatment 4 subjects, on average, have a lower value for the yacon 
cookie than treatment 3 does.  This result is consistent with our hypothesis related to the 
dampening effect of ambiguity on valuation of healthful products. 
Treatment 3’s mean WTP or bid is about $0.11 across all rounds, the highest 
among all the treatments as shown in Table 1.  This is the treatment that was given 
extensive risk information and life trade-off questions.  Treatment 2 subjects mean bid 
across all rounds is about $0.06.  The only difference between treatment 2 and treatment 
3 is the provision of life-trade off questions or elicitation of probability weights.  This 
result implies that the mere elicitation of the probability weights can make a difference in 
how subjects get to think about valuation of health risk reduction.  Hence, getting the 
subjects in treatment 3 to think about life-tradeoffs seem to have provided them incentive 
to value the healthful product more than subjects in treatment 2 who were given the same 
set of risk information but were not asked to think about life tradeoffs and probability 
weights.   10
Consistent with our hypothesis, the lowest bid in all rounds is for treatment 1.  
Treatment 1 received no specific health information.  Treatment 1 subjects’ bid for the 
yacon cookie then is solely dependent on whether they like it or not compared to the 
sugar cookie.  The WTPs for these 34 subjects are almost all zero, which is the minimum 
bid since they were not allowed to bid negative amounts.  In fact, only in round 6 did 
more than three subjects bid a non-zero amount.  Clearly, the reason for these results is 
that subjects preferred the taste of the regular sugar cookie to the yacon cookie, as Table 
1 shows.  They simply do not wish to pay anything additional for a cookie they do not 
like the taste of. 
  To further determine whether the treatments significantly influenced the WTPs, 
we estimated both a Tobit econometric model using only the 6
th round data and a random 
effects Tobit using data from all six rounds (see Table 2).  We estimated the Tobit models 
because of the mass of the dependent variable (the bid) located at $0.00.  Using all the 
rounds, the Tobit model was also adjusted to incorporate random effects to account for 
the panel nature of the data since each subject submitted bids in multiple rounds.  We 
estimated a random effects Tobit model in addition to the Tobit model because this would 
use all the available information from all the rounds and this would provide us 
information on the statistical differences in the WTPs between rounds.  Control variables 
included in the models are taste of Yacon cookie, round dummies, and demographics 
such as gender, age, education, and income. 
As seen in Table 2, the treatment dummy variables are significantly different from 
zero (and positive) and from treatment 1 which is the base treatment group in the model.  
The dummy variables for the rounds are statistically significant as well, with the   11
exception of round 1.  The negative sign of the coefficients of the dummy variables for 
the rounds suggest that the WTP in the 6
th round is generally higher than in other rounds, 
as reflected as well in Figure 1.  Taste of the yacon cookie is indeed positively related to 
WTP in the random effects Tobit model.  Interestingly, female subjects tend to bid lower 
than male subjects.  
 
 
4. Conclusions and Implications 
People are becoming more and more interested in the health risk reduction 
benefits of the products they purchase and consume.  As such, they are actively seeking 
out products that are able to effectively communicate this information.  Our results 
suggest that subjects’ willingness to pay for a product may vary depending on the type of 
health risk information they are given, which influences their risk perceptions.  Using 
Tobit and random effects Tobit models, we reject the hypothesis that bids are equivalent 
across treatments.  Therefore, uncertainty or risk-reducing benefits do play a role in 
valuation of products with novel health benefits that come much later in life.  Our 
experiments with undergraduate students indicate that even young students may be 
willing to pay for these healthful products.  Our results suggest that they may even be 
willing to pay for them even if the taste is not as good as the other regular products with 
less healthful benefits. 
 Our results have meaningful implications for marketing practice.  Due to 
increasing concerns about diet and health, many companies are developing and marketing 
products with novel health benefits.  Functional foods, for example, have become   12
increasingly popular in recent years.  Defined as foods or food components that may 
provide a health benefit beyond basic nutrition, functional foods are widely believed to 
offer consumers an increased ability to reduce the risk of certain diseases or health 
problems (Schmidt, 2000).   Research conducted by the International Food Information 
Council (IFIC) shows that consumer demand for functional foods has steadily increased 
since 1996.  Hasler (1998a, b) also rated functional food second only to low fat foods as a 
key product development opportunity. 
As mentioned previously, firms often try to differentiate their products by 
introducing additional product features or attributes.  For example, food and 
pharmaceutical companies are spending millions of research dollars to develop new 
products with healthful attributes.  To successfully launch and differentiate these new 
products, however, it is essential to know whether presentation of health-risk reduction 
information might influence willingness to pay for the new product.  Our results signify 
the importance of provision of health risk reduction information to consumers. 
 
5. Limitations and Future Directions 
Although our study throws considerable light on the effects of risk reduction 
information about a novel attribute, little is still generally known about the effects of 
novel attributes on product evaluation (Mukherjee and Hoyer 2001).  Future research 
should replicate our study using other products with novel attributes to assess the 
robustness of our findings.  It is also possible that individuals would weigh options 
differently to different types of health risk information (e.g., information not tied to 
specific diseases) or to different ways of presenting the information (Chen and Jia 2005).    13
More research is also needed to assess the best way of eliciting probability weights and 
how they can be specifically used in marketing applications in a practical and pragmatic 
way.  
  In an era of rising product differentiation, experimental economics is playing an 
increasingly important role in assessing the importance of various factors such as health 
risk information on the valuation and targeting of novel and healthful products to specific 
consumer segments.  We used the Vickrey auction to elicit our WTP.  However, choice 
of auction institution could influence willingness to pay values (Lusk, Feldkamp, and 
Schroeder 2004).  Replicating our study with the use of other auction institutions (e.g., 
English, Becker-DeGroot-Marschak, Random nth price auctions) and a more diverse 
sample might be another way of assessing the robustness of our findings.  It would also 
be interesting to compare the use of different types of experimental elicitation methods 
(e.g., experimental auctions, choice experiments, contingent valuations).  Despite the 
theoretical advantages of experimental auctions, they could exhibit some practical 
limitations.  For example, as Wertenbrock and Skiera (2002) alluded to, in contrast to the 
practically unrestricted supply of goods in retail settings, bidders compete with one 
another for a limited stock.  The decision on how much to bid may also reflect not just 
the bidder’s true valuation of the good but also of ensuring that he or she places the 
winning bid.  
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Table 1. Mean Taste Responses and Mean WTP by Treatment Group* 
 Treatment  1 




(n = 51) 
Treatment 4 
(n = 27) 
Taste, sugar cookie 
(mean, 1 to 5 scale) 
 
Taste, Yacon cookie 
(mean, 1 to 5 scale) 
 
Mean WTP, 6
th round  
 


































































* Treatment 1 was given no specific health information; 2 is presented with 
“expert/objective” risks; 3 receives risks and is asked probability weighting function; and 
Treatment 4 is presented with ambiguity (2 expert assessments that vary). Taste scale of 1 is 
“don’t like it at all” up to a 5, which is “I really like it.” 
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Table 2. Tobit and Random Effects Tobit Estimates 
Variable   Tobit  (6
th round)    Random Effects (All rounds) 
Constant   1.53      0.53 
   (2.14)      (0.65) 
treatment2   0.65***     0.35*** 
   (0.25)      (0.07) 
treatment3   0.46*      0.25*** 
   (0.24)      (0.06) 
treatment4   0.46*      0.29*** 
   (0.27)      (0.07) 
round1         0.06 
        (0.04) 
round2         -0.11*** 
        (0.04) 
round3         -0.09** 
        (0.04) 
round4         -0.11** 
        (0.04) 
round5         -0.10** 
        (0.04) 
yacon  taste   0.09      0.07*** 
   (0.07)      (0.02) 
female    -0.28*      -0.08* 
   (0.16)      (0.04) 
age    -0.05      -0.01 
   (0.06)      (0.01) 
education   -0.09      -0.05 
   (0.15)      (0.04) 
family  income   -1.9E-6    -6.3E-7 
   (1.7E-6)     (4.9E-7) 
Note: *, **, and *** represent 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels of statistical significance, 
respectively.  “Yacon taste” is taste of yacon cookie with scale of 1 to 5.  “Treatment” 
variables are dummies for the treatments,  “round” variables are dummies for the rounds, 
female is gender dummy, age and education variables are in years, and family income is 
in dollars.  Numbers in parentheses are standard errors. 
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Figure 1. Mean Willingness to Pay or Bids 











Treatment 1 Treatment 2 Treatment 3 Treatment 4
 
 